![]() |
Aviation of World War II |
![]() ![]() |
Soviet Union | Lend - Lease | Facts | Forum | Germany | Japan | R A F | U S A A F | Other | Photos |
Facts | People | Engines | Aces | Aircraft Handbook | WWII Periodicals | Contact | |
From BMW VI to M-17On Search of an Engine![]()
Soon after the Junkers concession enterprise in Fili was set up it became evident that hopes for a rapidly developing an aircraft engine industry based on this concession were not justified. Therefore, when in late 1923 the famous German company Bayrische Motorenwerke (BMW) proposed establishing production of its engines in Russia, the idea met with approval. Here is the opinion of the All-Union Council of the National Economy leadership on this question (February 4,1924): "As is known, the Junkers firm is obliged by the concession agreement to organize this (aircraft engine) production. Owing to recent friction surrounding implementation of this agreement, certain apprehensions arose as to whether production would be organized properly. Therefore, taking into consideration this circumstance, the BMW offer is very interesting and timely". BMW representatives, including General Director Popp, came to Moscow to discuss specific forms of cooperation. The Germans offered technical aid in founding a modern plant to produce BMW engines in Moscow or Petrograd. Our plans were more modest—set up a mixed company or acquire a license to produce the engines at an extant plant. A variant calling for BMW participation in the work of the Junkers concession was also considered. But, interest in the BMW proposal soon vanished. The firm's best engine, the BMW IV, had undergone testing at the Scientific Aircraft Engine Institute (NAMI) in Moscow. Its actual power was estimated at just 230-240hp, instead of the 300hp claimed. Young engineer V. Ya. Klimov, who later became an academician and designer of many famous aircraft engines, led the testing program. In addition, after the Western countries lifted the economic blockade in 1924, the USSR began producing American 400hp Liberty and French 300 hp Hispano-Suiza 8Fb engines (we designated them M-5 and M-6, respectively). The "engine hunger" was partially overcome. Some hopes in regard to Junkers remained, too. It promised to begin making its new L-5 engine at the Fili plant. "The All-Union Council of the National Economy Concession Committee considers it proper to suspend negotiations with BMW regarding technical aid in producing aircraft engines...," a document dated December 22, 1924 stated. By the autumn of 1925. the situation had changed. The Soviet government decided to cancel the Junkers concession and there was no hope left that it would help in engine production. The M-5 and M-6 engines no longer met modern requirements (this is not surprising since the Liberty; the prototype of the most powerful Soviet M-5 engine, was designed during the First World War). The following decision was adopted at a joint meeting of Air Forces and industry representatives on October 19. 1925: "To recognize as definitely desirable the attraction of first-class foreign engine manufacturing companies for both technical assistance and immediate work in the USSR". The government tasked the Engineering Department of the Soviet Trade Representative Office in Berlin "to probe" the capabilities of German engine building companies. In its reply prepared in early 1926, it reported: We got in touch with the Daimler firm, which unites Mercedes and Benz plants... The aforementioned firm has not engaged in aircraft engine production since 1918 and comparatively lags behind where design is concerned. Therefore, it can hardly be of interest to us regarding technical aid to Aviatrust in aviation engine building. ... As for the Maybach firm, the information we have suggests that its plant is building only engines for airships and its latest achievement was a 420hp engine made in 1924 for the Zeppelin that made a flight to America. Thus, the Maybach plant is not able to provide direct technical assistance to our plants interested in the production of aircraft engines. ... BMW remains the firm most interesting to us. One must add that the company had begun series production of the new V-12 water-cooled 500hp BMW VI engine by 1926. It had the important advantage of being a high-altitude engine, i. e. it could preserve its power in the process of climbing to altitude, whereas ordinary engines rapidly lose power due to reduced air density: This quality was achieved because the engine was designed to deliver full power (500hp) at altitude rather than on the ground. Its power was higher on the ground (by around 30%). but this regime could be maintained only for a very short time. In other words, the engine was created with "reserve power," which could only be realized at altitudes. This type of high-altitude engine was dubbed "oversized". Appearance of the BMW VI immediately attracted the attention of specialists in the USSR. Aviatrust managers wrote the following in this regard: The most powerful engine produced at Aviatrust plants is a copy of the American 400 hp Liberty - known here as the M-5. This is not a high-altitude engine, so its power at an altitude of 2000 meters does not exceed 200hp. Requirements levied on a modern aircraft engine are significantly higher. It must deliver at least 400hp at an altitude of 3500-4000 meters. An engine with this power is to be installed in a series of airplanes destined to enter the inventory in the near future: powerful fighters, a reconnaissance aircraft, and a bomber. After careful consideration of an engine satisfying the aforementioned requirements, the BMW VI, which can deliver 600hp on the ground, was chosen. The BMW VI engine meets Air Forces Directorate specifications regarding both power and operational performance. This engine presents less difficulties from a production standpoint than any other. A delegation comprising Aviatrust Board member I. K. Mikhaylov and Glavmetall representatives D. F. Budnyak and E. A Chudakov went to Germany in February 1927 for talks with BMW. On February 4th. the Soviet Trade Representative Office in Berlin reported the following: "The commission that Comrade Budnyak headed conducted an inspection at the BMW plant in Munich. The team unanimously concluded that we can limit ourselves to buying a license for the BMW VI, because the firm's achievements in other spheres of technical assistance do not offer us anything of value". In the course of the negotiations, it was learned that electrical equipment and some engine components were produced by other German firms rather than by BMW. For example, the crankshaft production method was a Krupp secret. However, these problems were solved and, on October 14, 1927, BMW General Director F. Popp and Aviatrust Board Chairman M. G. Urivayev signed a license agreement on BMW VI engine production in the USSR" According to the agreement, BMW granted our country the right to produce BMW VI engines at any plant in the USSR for 5 years. BMW also promised to provide consulting services in establishment of engine production and, in the event of necessity, send its engineers to the USSR to assist. Another stipulation was that the firm would inform the Soviet side about all improvements in its engines. For this, the Soviet side paid lump-sum compensation of $50,000 and, in addition, deducted 7.5% of the cost of every engine produced in the USSR. After that, Aviatrust signed an agreement with the Robert Bosch Electrical Company in Stuttgart for technical assistance in production of magnetos and spark plugs for aircraft engines (Plant No. 12 in Moscow was to produce them). The company also agreed with Krupp to purchase crankshafts and bearings for the BMW engine. |
|
Engines Articles | Designers | AM-35A/37 | AM-38 | M-105 | VK-107 | ASh-82 | BMW VI - M-17 | BMW 801D | NK-12 | Engine Maintenance Manuals Rolls-Royce Merlin | Rolls-Royce Merlin 25 | |