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Fi 156. Combat Use.
Operation Weissa, Autumn 1939Only eleven days after the show, the war broke out in Kovno. In September 1939, Shtorkhs were actively used during the fighting in Poland. The number of aircraft of this type in that period is difficult to estimate. In addition to a few copies of the A series, the army had 270 C-1 series aircraft. The versatility of the "Shtorch" led to the fact that the aircraft had to solve the widest range of tasks. Aircraft of this type were part of various units and formations. They were used to transport couriers and messengers, as well as for reconnaissance. "Shtorch" was a multi-purpose aircraft. On the morning of September 1, 1939, on the outskirts of Veluni, a bullet pierced the fuel tank at the Storch, on which the commander of the VIII Aviation Corps, Lieutenant General Wolfram von Richthofen, flew. Despite the fact that gasoline was pouring from the tank, the plane reached the front line. Two days later, another Storch from the headquarters of the 3rd Army (Armeeoberkommando 3) fell victim to the Polish anti-aircraft gunners. On the same day, another Storch from 1./Aufklaerungsgruppe (H) 14 was mistakenly shot down by German troops. On the morning of September 9, 1939, a Fi-156C from II./LG 2, piloted by non-commissioned officer Shigorra, took off from the Wolbozh field airfield near Tomaszow Mazowiecki. The passenger seat was occupied by Major Werner Spielvogel, whose task was to find suitable targets for his Hs-123 Henschel division on the outskirts of Warsaw. The plane was flying from Służewiec through Mokotów and Ochota, where it came under aimed fire from Polish anti-aircraft artillery and made an emergency landing on one of the Warsaw streets. Spielvogel tried to pull the seriously wounded Shigorra out of the burning plane, but the Poles opened heavy fire on the plane, and both German pilots died on the spot. The next morning, another Storch from 4./Aufklaerungsgruppe (H) 23, attached to Army Group South, crashed at a field airfield near Lublinz. On September 12, another aircraft from the 4th Air Fleet was seriously damaged during landing. Inspection showed that the aircraft was beyond repair. On September 27, 1939, while making an emergency landing near the village of Paelevy, a Storch from 4. Aufklaerungsgruppe (H) 21 crashed. » Non-46S/Ne-45. The group operated in the zone of responsibility of the XIII Army Corps Lodz-Skierniewice-Kutno. The group had at least three Fi-156s that were used as courier aircraft, so it was not in serious danger. However, the group lost the Storch 4E + NN, which crashed while landing at the Sarnow airfield. The other two Storchs of the group were numbered 4E+LP and 4E+UL. The experience of the Polish campaign showed the vulnerability of the Storch, whose fragile structure turned out to be vulnerable not only to anti-aircraft artillery fire, but also to fire from hand weapons. Therefore, it was decided not to use the Fi-156 for reconnaissance of the battlefield in the future. In addition, the experience of the battles showed that the Storch needed weapons. As a result, the C-3 model appeared, equipped with an Argus As 10R-1 engine and a MG 15 machine gun. The radio equipment was removed from the aircraft, while the design of the fuselage frame was somewhat changed. The possibility of transporting a third person in a folding seat has been preserved. Meanwhile, the blitzkrieg in the east ended and the sitzkrieg began in the west. By May 1, 1940, the Luftwaffe received three hundred and fifty-five Storchs of various series. Of these, two hundred and seventy-seven were in good condition, 18 were in need of repair, and sixty were written off for various reasons. In Operation Weseruebung, which began on April 9, 1940, only a few Storchs participated. At the same time, the aircraft were used only as courier aircraft, not using them for reconnaissance. The main park was taken care of in preparation for an offensive operation in France. Shtorkhs were also used for reconnaissance of French forward positions, several cases of Fi-156 sightings were recorded on the other side of the front. The French soldiers nicknamed the Fi-156 the word mouchard - "spy". Niwi, 1940Under this secret name was an operation carried out using the ability of the Shtorkhov to take off and land on a patch. For the impending attack on the Benelux, two options were considered. The first option involved landing on Belgian territory in the zone of action of the tank group of General von Kleist in order to accelerate the advance of German troops through the Ardennes. Another option called for an amphibious landing in the zone of operations of the XIII Army Corps in Luxembourg, not far from the border with France. This operation was aimed at strengthening the southern flank of the troops and speeding up their advance. The first scenario was designated "Niwi", and the second - "Rosa". In the end, the first scenario was preferred, since Luxembourg did not seem like a serious target worthy of a landing. The area between Neufchâteau, Bastienne and Martelange was chosen as the place for the landing as part of Operation Niwi. The capture of this region was of key importance in the development of the offensive of the XIX Panzer Corps. The purpose of the landing was to keep the roads clear for the movement of tank columns, as well as to eliminate possible counter-actions from the Belgian army. The planning of the operation went on in February 1940, but later it turned out that the Belgian troops were redeployed to the north, and this direction remained practically defenseless. Since most of the transport aircraft were occupied as part of Army Group B in Holland, it was decided to use a hundred Shtorchs for the landing. Only three Junkers Ju-52/3m transports were available. The general leadership of the aviation involved in the operation was carried out by Major Otto Förster. As a landing, it was supposed to land units of the elite infantry regiment "Grossdeutschland", stationed in Crailsheim. In Hildesheim there was a battalion of special-purpose paratroopers Sturmabteilung "Koch", which was faced with the task of occupying the Belgian fort Eben-Emael. The paratroopers were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Eugen Garski. commander of the III battalion of the regiment "Grossdeutschland". All Fi-156s allocated for participation in the Niwi operation were assembled at the Crailsheim airfield in February 1940 in order to conduct exercises before the landing itself. It was expected that the Belgian Ardennes chasseurs would put up serious resistance, so the paratroopers received a large number of machine guns and anti-tank weapons. The landing was to take place in two areas. In the south, the area of the settlement of Vitry was chosen as the point of landing. It was planned to land 240 people here, delivering them on 56 aircraft. This group was supposed to be Garski himself with two radio stations for communication with the northern group and the headquarters of the XIX Panzer Corps. The northern region was at Nives. It was planned to throw 160 paratroopers here with the help of 42 Shtorkhovs. This group was led by Captain Walter Krueger. The landing area was ten kilometers from the Luxembourg border and sixty kilometers from the German border. The flight time from two airfields near Bitburg was about half an hour. This meant that the first echelon of the landing force had to hold out without reinforcements for more than one hour. On May 9, 1940, all paratroopers and equipment were transferred to these airfields. On May 10, at 4:20 am, the landing began. Aircraft aimed at Vitry were based at Dockendorf, while those flying towards Nives were based at Pützhöhe. To avoid meeting with enemy fighters, the flight was made by two dispersed groups at extremely low altitude. The first "Storch" from the "northern group" was led by Major Förster himself, and Captain Kruger was sitting behind him. Förster soon made a navigational error and began to take south, followed by his entire group. Soon Förster crossed the course of the southern group and took some of the aircraft with him. As a result, Garsky was over the target with only four aircraft and nine people. Worst of all, the radio station ended up in one of the stray planes. Therefore, Garsky could not contact Krueger and headquarters to report what had happened. Nevertheless, Garsky proceeded to carry out the combat mission. Meanwhile, Förster discovered his mistake. Therefore, he managed to send a second echelon to Vitry and Neaves, as well as toss reinforcements to Kruger's group. During the landing of the first echelon, several Shtorkhovs were damaged. Eight of them could not take off, so they had to be destroyed on the ground. Kruger's group landed in the Runsimon area near the village of Lelyse. In total, about one hundred and eighty people landed, that is, twice as many as planned. Having cut the nearest telephone lines, the Germans began to requisition from the population all available vehicles, with the help of which they intended to make a throw to the north and reach the area outlined by the plan. The Belgian command quickly assessed the situation and sent two motorcycle platoons from 1. Regiment de Chasseur Ardennes to the landing area. Kruger managed to repulse the Belgian attack and headed north to join Garski. A small cover detachment remained in Leliza. Belgian troops entered Lelis an hour after the last German soldier left the village. Unable to determine the direction of the enemy's departure, the Belgians returned in the afternoon. In the meantime, Garsky's detachment began cutting telephone wires, blocking roads and capturing all the Belgian soldiers they met. Until 7:00 the Germans did not meet any resistance. In the meantime, the third echelon landed, which was re-formed specifically in order to strengthen the weakened Garsky squad. By evening, Garski's detachment, by that time already numbering about three hundred soldiers, connected with the advanced units of the 1st Panzer Division. The next day, a Ju-52/3T landed at Chaumont with supplies for Garsky's group. But three shots from a nearby Belgian T-13 tank caused the landed transporter to catch fire. Another transport "Junker" was shot down by a Belgian patrol in the Grand Rosieres area. The Belgian-French units, using tanks, began to push the German paratroopers. During the battle, three Storchs were shot down, trying to deliver ammunition to Garski. In the evening, the Allies withdrew their tanks, and the German paratroopers again entered the Niva. In the early morning, the French tried to counterattack, but the counterattack bogged down, colliding with the tanks of the 2nd Panzer Division, which entered Niva at night. This ended Operation Niwi. German losses amounted to about thirty people from the Garsky group and Luftwaffe personnel, as well as sixteen Storchs. In general, the operation can hardly be considered successful. One might even question its necessity as such. The advancing German units very quickly had to face obstacles created by their own landing. Despite this, many participants in the landing received Iron Crosses, and Garsky became a holder of the Knight's Cross. Encirclement, May 1940In parallel with the Niwi operation, Hitler proposed to conduct another operation with the aim of quickly capturing five strategically important nodes south of Luxembourg City. Lieutenant General Walter Model was responsible for planning and conducting the operation. Volunteers from the 34th Infantry Division were sent to training centers in Kraileheim and Böblingen. Of these, one hundred and twenty-five people were selected. The selected were transferred to Crailsheim, where they were divided into five groups - one for each target. Each group received additional weapons: machine guns, mines and anti-tank weapons. The overall command of the paratroopers was entrusted to Lieutenant Werner Hedderich. and the detachment was given the name Luftlandkommando "Hedderich". In April 1940, the entire group underwent further training in Trevir. In the same place, at 4:30 am on May 10, paratroopers of the first echelon boarded 25 Shtorkhovs. The whole group flew to the target in a long column, after which it was divided into five parts and each part went to a given area. The entire landing area was perfectly visible from the French positions and allowed complete control of the highway network in the south of Luxembourg. At 05:00, the headquarters of the 16th Army reported to the leadership of Army Group A that the landing of the first echelon was generally successful. Not without the usual overlays. Several aircraft were damaged, including aircraft beyond repair. They had to be destroyed on the spot. But most of the planes managed to take off and return. The landing party encountered strong resistance. If not for the approach of three motorized support groups (Vorausabteilung) from the 34th Infantry Division, the landing would have been inevitably destroyed. In general, the operation was a success only thanks to the passivity of the French side. The operation cost Germany thirty soldiers killed and five destroyed Storchs. |
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