Aviation of World War II
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Aviation of World War II |
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GIAP - Gvardeyskiy istrebitel'nyy aviatsionnyy polk - Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment LII - Letno issledovatel'skiy institut - Flight Research Institute NKAP - Narodnyy komissariat aviatsionnoy proomyshlennosti - People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry TsAGI - Tsentral'nyy AeroGidrodinamicheskiy Institut - Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute TsIAM - Tsentral'nyy institut aviatsionnogo motorostroyeniya - Central Institute of Aviation Motors IAS - Inzhenerno Aviatsionnaya Sluzhba - Aviation Engineering Service t.t.t. - taktiko tekhnicheskiye trebovaniya - tactical technical requirements Deputy People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry of the USSR A.S. Yakovlev was, of course, a bright, extraordinary personality, and the decisions he made were far from always unambiguous. But, analyzing the situation on the fronts, by May 1942 he came to an absolutely correct conclusion: in order to gain air supremacy on a local sector of the front, it is necessary to have aviation groupings of the type of regiments and divisions of the reserve of the Supreme High Command that appeared later, capable of solving strategic tasks. He outlined his thoughts on this issue in a memorandum by A.I. Shakhurin May 6, 1942: «... The need is put forward to use, at least in small quantities, single-seat fighters with flight and combat qualities that significantly exceed those of modern enemy fighters. Skillfully maneuvering and transferring small groups of such powerful high-speed fighters along the front, one can achieve psychological first of all, and then military predominance in the air on a given sector of the front. I consider it expedient to launch a series of up to 100 I-185 single-seat fighter aircraft powered by the M-71 engine, armed with two ShVAK synchronous cannons. As per your data: maximum ground speed with afterburner - 556 km/h, at 6170 m - 630 km/h, rate of climb at 5000 m - 5.2 min, and in terms of fire power, the I-185 surpasses all enemy fighters, including such as the Xe-113 (until the summer of 1942, we mistakenly designated Messerschmitt Bf-109F fighters.) and FV- 190. In view of this, I consider it necessary to immediately launch a military series of I-185 fighters at factory No. 31 in Tbilisi. 
Thus, it was openly admitted that by the summer of 1942, only the I-185 was the only aircraft that was not inferior in performance to the latest German fighters. The above document clearly shows Yakovlev's policy: the use of the I-185 to replace the La-5. But objectively he was right: the time has come to take care of the quality of our fighter aircraft. However, Yakovlev's call went unheeded: the aircraft industry was just beginning to emerge from the crisis caused by the evacuation, so the leadership of the NKAP and the Air Force was primarily concerned with the problem of saturating our aviation with combat aircraft, and not its quality level. The introduction of fundamentally new machines into the series led to a reduction in the rate of production (even if it was temporary and at one plant), which, in the opinion of the management, was unacceptable. Intense air battles in the sky of Stalingrad showed that not only quantitative, but also qualitative superiority remains with the enemy - the Messerschmitt Bf-109F and Bf-109G fighters surpassed Soviet aircraft in terms of combined characteristics. The training of the flight crew also played a significant role in the results of air battles. As a result, the Germans in August-September 1942 completely seized air supremacy. Representatives of the Air Force Research Institute Anoprienko, Zaitsev, Stepanets sent to the Stalingrad and Don fronts in September 1942 stated that the Yak-1 and Yak-7 with the M-105PF engine are inferior to German fighters in speed in certain altitude ranges, rate of climb and vertical maneuver and capable of fighting with them only defensive battles. The weak armament of the Yak-1 was noted and the opinion of front-line pilots was cited that in order to successfully conduct air battles in these conditions, it is necessary to have a double superiority of forces. The same applied, though to a lesser extent, to the La-5 fighter. Urgent measures were required to improve the combat effectiveness of production aircraft. In the Yakovlev and Lavochkin Design Bureau, together with TsAGI, TsIAM, and the Air Force Research Institute, modifications were urgently developed in which the flight weight of the vehicles was reduced, aerodynamics were improved, and the weight of a second salvo was increased. Nevertheless, the task of creating a powerful fighter aircraft that outperformed enemy fighters in terms of aggregate flight characteristics remained very relevant. On the factory tests of the "standard for the series" resumed on August 10, 1942, it was possible to achieve high performance for that time: the maximum speed near the ground was 537 km / h and 577 km / h in afterburner, at an altitude of 6100 m - 667 km / h. The fighter gained an altitude of 5000 m in 4.7 minutes, the turn time at an altitude of 1000 m was 21-22 s. Flight weight reached 3650 kg. In overload under the wing, the aircraft could carry two bombs weighing 250 kg each. Such a bomb load was quite comparable with the load of some of our bombers, for example the Pe-2, and significantly exceeded the load of domestic single-seat fighters of that time. The factory test report states that the I-185 "according to its flight data is superior to serial domestic and foreign aircraft, in terms of piloting technique it is simple and accessible to pilots of medium qualification", that its operation is possible at field airfields, which flight characteristics, maneuverability and controllability are good, in all modes the aircraft is easily balanced by controlled trim tabs”. At the end of August, Yakovlev agreed with the Air Force to test the I-185 in combat conditions on the Kalinin Front. 
January 16 2013
Phrase on the forum: "I-185 was hacked to death thanks to Yakovlev's intrigues" - This is probably not true. The conditions under which the I-185 fighter was not put into production were rather objective. Plus fatal failures with the engine. Once again, thesis on the stages of creating an aircraft: - On May 5, 1942, tests of the LaG-5 were completed. Lavochkin, thanks to the installation of the M-82 engine on the LaGG-3, managed to stay afloat and introduce his fighter at the plant where the production of the Yakovlev fighter was being prepared. In May-June, the defeat of Soviet troops in the Crimea and near Kharkov. In August - the exit of the Germans to Stalingrad and the foothills of the Caucasus. Under these conditions, the decision to release the La-5 is completely justified, the front urgently needs a new aircraft. May 6, 1942 Yakovlev writes a letter to Shakhurin with a request to arrange the production of 100 I-185 aircraft. Yakovlev helps Polikarpov in every possible way with front-line tests of the I-185. January 26, 2013
- LaG-5, the same LaGG-3, but with a new engine, was an aircraft ready for production with well-established technology. The release of the I-185 would inevitably entail a decrease in the number of aircraft produced. - February 16, 1943, 2 weeks after the victory at Stalingrad. At a meeting with Stalin, Polikarpov's letter is discussed. Shakhurin and Yakovlev are present. Stalin comes up with the idea of allegedly unfinished long-range tests of the I-185. - March 4, 1943 Yakovlev writes a letter to Shakhurin with a request to arrange for the immediate production of the I-185 (and his own Yak-9 with the M-107A engine, also a problematic engine, like the M-71). Instead of setting up production, correspondence continues to assess the range of the aircraft, although it is obvious that the range is sufficient and exceeds the range of other fighters. - April 5, 1943 long-range tests lead to severe disaster, test pilot, Colonel V.A. Stepanchenko died. - Reading the list of defects of the La-7 aircraft, one can come to the conclusion that most of them are technological defects. It is not yet known how, in the conditions of military production, a more technologically sophisticated machine could be put into production. As we can see, the high temperature in the cockpit of Lavochkin's aircraft, which has been declined many times in the literature, was also high in the I-185. Moreover, Lavochkin could not solve this issue, so when testing the serial La-7, the temperature in the cockpit with the canopy closed was 47 degrees. February 03, 2013
- The I-185 wing, two-spar, all-metal, had a sheathing made of duralumin sheets, riveted "spot". Isn't it an unprecedented "waste", because aluminum is so needed for tens of thousands of T-34s. (details on aluminum on the forum thread) So the drawings of metal wing spars for Lavochkin's aircraft were developed only in the summer of 1943 in Nizhny Tagil at plant No. 381 under the guidance of chief designer P.D. Grushin ... - Again, an aircraft with a large wing load had to have good mechanization, the I-185 had it, and in this case it had a low landing speed. As we know, non-release of flaps, then just flaps, was a scourge for Lavochkin's aircraft, due to the loss of hydraulic fluid, due to defects in the hydraulic system tubes. Obviously, these tubes would have the same defects on Polikarpov's aircraft. The question is, was landing possible and what would be the landing speeds for the I-185? Obviously, they would be more than Lavochkin's. - The M-71 engine was never completed. Unfortunately, the appearance of the I-185 did not take place. However, it should be said that Soviet aircraft designers were able to achieve the best possible results in the most difficult conditions with simple means and the most primitive structural materials. In wartime conditions, aircraft were manufactured by factories whose technological level, as well as the qualifications of workers, could not be compared with Western factories. April 15, 2014
The M-71 engine had a takeoff power of 2000 hp; and nominal - 1550 liters; at an altitude of 5500 m. In the M-71F version, the engine had a takeoff power of 2200 liters; and nominal 1800 l.; at an altitude of 3600 m. It is difficult to explain why both motors were not brought to mass production. In any case, the point is not in the objective difficulties of fine-tuning and overstressing of the motors. Comparison of the M-81 and M-71 with the serial M-63 in terms of specific takeoff parameters (Table 1) shows that both engines were less loaded than their well-mastered predecessors, and there is no reason to consider them overly forced. Table 1
Most likely, the main role was played not so much by insufficient communication as by subjective reasons and distrust of the governing authorities in the competitiveness of air-cooled motors compared to water-cooled motors. The first failures with the M-87 and M-88 engines, the superiority of the Messerschmitts over the I-16, the successes of fighters with the M-105 engines - all this back in 1939 - 1940. caused a wary attitude towards air-cooled motors in general, which left its mark on the subsequent attitude towards them. Of course, the significant weakening of the leadership of the serial plant had a certain significance. In 1938, the main executives of this motor plant, the best in terms of culture, were arrested. A.D. Shvetsov had to combine the duties of the chief designer of the Design Bureau and the technical director of the plant during 1939-1940. (Aircraft building in the USSR 1917-1945 /TsAGI/) August 29, 2016
Lieutenant General Repnin A.K. having seen the best foreign models of fighters in the USA officially recognized that the I-185 is the best fighter in the world. - Vladimir |
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